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Abstract
In Europe, almost half of all jobs are found through personal contacts such as colleagues, family, or
friends. We analyse whether personal contacts facilitate access to jobs for the middle or the working
class. We do not treat informal ties as a homogeneous category, but distinguish work-related contacts
from communal contacts such as family, friends, and acquaintances. Our analysis is based on a longi-
tudinal survey of unemployed jobseekers in Switzerland that we match with administrative data. We
find that work-related ties are disproportionately used by individuals with favourable employment
prospects: middle-aged jobseekers with high prior earnings. In contrast, communal contacts chiefly
help jobseekers with poor employability, notably the low-skilled working class and workers dismissed
for non-economic reasons. Communal contacts thus compensate for the difficulty of finding a job
through other channels. However, the different search methods do not affect how wages evolve from
pre- to post-unemployment jobs. The unemployed who found a job via communal ties were earning
less than those using a work tie or a formal method to begin with.
Introduction
Between a third and half of all jobs in affluent market
economies are found through informal contacts such as
colleagues, family, or friends (Granovetter, 1974,
Pellizzari, 2010). Clearly, who you know is key for
where you work. We analyse how unemployed job-
seekers of different social classes find a job. More pre-
cisely, we examine the role that informal contacts play
for job access and the evolution of wages after a spell of
unemployment. Do informal contacts primarily facili-
tate the return to employment for members of the mid-
dle or the working class?
A first argument expects a middle-class bias in who
uses personal ties in the labour market. Jobseekers in
higher class positions befriend workers in similarly ad-
vantageous class positions—and these friends have more
information about job openings and more influence over
who gets these jobs (Bourdieu, 1979; Boxman, De Graaf
and Flap, 1991). A second argument maintains, on the
contrary, that social networks are not primarily used be-
cause a jobseeker has a lot of social capital, but because
he or she lacks formal educational credentials and there-
fore has no other choice. It may thus mainly be the
working class that substitutes informal contacts for the
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formal job search methods used by professionals and
managers (Corcoran, Datcher and Duncan, 1980: p. 35,
Chua, 2011).
Our article argues that by treating informal ties as a
homogeneous category, both expectations fall short of
making a convincing case. We therefore propose to re-
visit the distinction between work-related and commu-
nal ties—a distinction first made by Granovetter (1974:
p. 48) that was then superseded by his contrast between
strong and weak ties. We expect that contacts from
work are the upper-level job search method providing
exclusive information about job openings and trust-
worthy referrals for jobseekers. In contrast, communal
contacts such as family, friends, and acquaintances step
in as a channel of last resort, once other search methods
have failed (Loury, 2006: p. 302). Accordingly, job-
seekers with lower employability, such as the working
class, are likely to rely on communal ties, whereas job-
seekers with better labour market prospects, such as the
upper-middle class, more often find jobs through work-
related ties.
Empirically, we put a clear focus on active jobseekers
by using an inflow sample of newly unemployed work-
ers. We thus diverge from the bulk of research on per-
sonal contacts which analyses how employed
individuals found their last job. A major concern for
public policy across Europe is how to bring unemployed
workers back into jobs—and for this matter, generaliz-
ing results from studies on employed workers to un-
employed jobseekers is problematic. Studies on
employed workers include many non-searchers who
changed jobs only because they received unsolicited in-
formation from a personal contact.1 Accordingly, they
tend to overestimate the importance of informal ties for
unemployed jobseekers.
These studies are also likely to overestimate the wage
effect. Unlike unemployed jobseekers, employed non-
searchers are likely to accept a new job only if they are
offered a wage that equals (or exceeds) the wage earned
in their old job (McDonald and Elder, 2006: p. 522).
Moreover, while our survey measures starting wages
after a spell of unemployment, most studies on em-
ployed workers analyse current wages—and current
wages also include on-the-job wage rises that are related
to promotions and tenure, but unrelated to the way of
finding a job.
We further diverge from the handful of studies on
unemployed workers by surveying jobseekers both at
the beginning and the end of their unemployment spell.
This longitudinal data structure allows us to calculate
the within-person evolution in wages and thus to focus
on change rather than level of wages. This allows us to
get rid of time-constant unobserved heterogeneity that
afflicts cross-sectional analysis. If workers with different
wage levels have different probabilities of accessing a
job through either a work-related or communal contact,
the observed differences in post-unemployment wages
by hiring channel may well be spurious—as the two
groups had different pre-unemployment wages to begin
with.
Our analysis is based on a tailor-made inflow sample
of newly unemployed jobseekers in Switzerland, whom
we surveyed both at the entry into and the exit from the
unemployment system. By combining this longitudinal
survey with register data from the unemployment insur-
ance system, we obtain extensive information on 1,194
jobseekers.
We start our article by discussing the distinction be-
tween work-related and communal contacts and develop
our hypotheses. We then present the institutional con-
text of Switzerland and discuss our data and measures.
The first results section shows differences by class and
education in the use of work-related and communal con-
tacts to find a job. The second results section analyses
whether different ways of finding a job are associated
with differences in wages and unemployment duration.
The conclusion highlights our key findings.
Social Classes and the Use of Informal
Contacts
Why would we expect a middle-class bias in the use of
personal contacts to get a job? Research in sociology
systematically finds that individuals tend to choose as
friends people who are similar to them—a phenomenon
known as homophily (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and
Cook, 2001). Jobseekers formerly employed in influen-
tial positions are thus likely to have friends in similar
positions and to be able to call upon personal contacts
with more information and greater influence to help
them in getting a job. Accordingly, managers and profes-
sionals—specialists with friends in high positions—
should be able to take greater advantage of informal
contacts in their job search than low-skilled workers
(Boxman, De Graaf and Flap, 1991).
At the other end of the class structure, individuals
suffering frequent spells of temporary work and un-
employment likely face the problem that their friends
will also be disproportionately un- and underemployed,
and hence in a poor position to offer job information
(Granovetter, 1974: p. 136). In a similar vein, Bourdieu
(1979) expected social capital to be correlated with eco-
nomic and cultural capital. Lower social classes indeed
have lower levels of social capital in Europe, and
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especially weaker associational networks (Pichler and
Wallace, 2009). The same finding has been made for un-
employed jobseekers in Switzerland (Bonoli and
Turtschi, 2015). Accordingly, people at the bottom of
the educational and class hierarchy may have a social
network that is of little help for getting a job.
But even though jobseekers in lower class positions
tend to have fewer and less influential friends—and
hence less social capital—they may nonetheless be more
likely to find a job thanks to a personal contact. Not
having much to offer in terms of formal credentials, they
depend more on privileged information about job vacan-
cies and on personal intermediaries who recommend
them to potential employers. Personal contacts may thus
compensate for the lack of formal education and facili-
tate the access to jobs (Chua, 2011: p. 3). This argument
not only applies to the working class, but also to young
labour market entrants and in particular to migrants.
Evidence from the United States suggests that social net-
works are crucial for migrants, notably Hispanic men,
who use them to bypass limitations in language and
knowledge of the local labour market (Green, Tigges
and Diaz, 1999, Smith, 2000: p. 521).
However, the use of recruitment channels not only
depends on the characteristics of the jobseeker, but also
on those of the hiring firm—and low educated workers
may be more likely to find a job through an informal
contact because of employers’ behaviour. Typical em-
ployers of low-skilled labour have less standardized re-
cruitment practices than organizations mainly hiring
high-skilled labour—compare hotels and construction
firms with public administrations and banks.
Recruitment through informal contacts presents em-
ployers with three advantages: (i) it does not involve any
costs linked to advertisement or formal intermediaries
and is thus cheap; (ii) it leads to reliable job candidates
for whom common acquaintances, by recommending
them, act as pre-screeners; (iii) it allows employers to fill
vacancies quickly (Marsden and Gorman, 2001: pp.
470, 476).
Empirical evidence suggests that informal recruit-
ment is particularly prevalent in the market for unskilled
labour. Among youth in Europe, no occupational group
has a higher probability to be hired informally—through
family or friends—than workers in elementary occupa-
tions (Harsløf, 2006: p. 569–570). Likewise, an analysis
of the European Community Household Panel shows
that blue-collar workers are more likely to work in jobs
found through personal contacts than white-collar em-
ployees (Pellizzari, 2010: p. 501)—a finding confirmed
by a large employer survey in France (Bessy and
Marchal, 2009: p. 136). Research from the United
States indicates that blue-collar, low-wage, and non-
professional jobs are more frequently filled via informal
contacts than jobs held by college-educated, white-collar
workers (Corcoran, Datcher and Duncan, 1980: pp. 33–
35, Mouw, 2003: p. 880).
However, the empirical evidence is not as clear-cut
as these studies suggest. Totally, 61 per cent of high-
level managers in the Netherlands located their current
jobs using informal means, a proportion far above the
Dutch average (Boxman, De Graaf and Flap, 1991).
Likewise, French workers from a higher class origin
more frequently resort to non-family ties or their school
network to find a job than workers from a lower class
origin (Forse´, 2001: p. 200).
The disparity between these results is partly ex-
plained by the fact that studies finding a lower-class bias
in using informal contacts focus on family and friends
(Harsløf, 2006, Pellizzari, 2010), whereas studies re-
porting an upper-class bias in using informal contacts
deal with work-related ties (Boxman, De Graaf and
Flap, 1991, Forse´, 2001). Accordingly, we need to disag-
gregate the two types of contacts (Bridges and Villemez,
1986).
The Distinction between Work-Related and
Communal Contacts
Mark Granovetter is widely known for his distinction
between weak and strong ties. However, his early work
also emphasized the importance of whether an interper-
sonal tie was situated in a work-related (occupational)
or a family-social (communal) context (Granovetter,
1974: pp. 44–48). This distinction seems more helpful
for the analysis of labour market outcomes than the con-
trast between weak and strong ties, and the two distinc-
tions overlap only partially: work-related ties are often
weak ties, but people also make close friends—and
hence strong ties—at work. Likewise, communal ties
often tend to be strong ties, but they also include ac-
quaintances and neighbours with whom interactions are
infrequent and the ties weak.
We expect work contacts to be more instrumental
than communal ties because they provide the key re-
sources that give jobseekers an advantage in job search:
information about upcoming job vacancies and influ-
ence on employers. In addition, employers are prone to
trust the recommendations of work contacts more than
those of the applicant’s family, friends, and neighbours.
The latter not only appear more biased towards the job-
seeker, but also less competent in judging his or her
productivity. In general, employers seem to consider ap-
plicants who are referred by their own employees as
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particularly interesting. Employees know what the job is
about—and they care about their reputation and the
productivity of someone who might work alongside
them (Bonoli and Hinrichs, 2012: p. 356).
A broad range of work contacts is probably a by-
product of a successful career (Bridges and Villemez,
1986: p. 579). It should thus correlate positively with
education and class position. Therefore, jobseekers in
subordinate class positions may be less likely to benefit
from their work-related network when looking for em-
ployment than jobseekers in higher class positions.
Contrary to work contacts, a jobseeker’s communal
ties may not give an advantage over formal job search
methods, but rather compensate for the difficulty of ob-
taining a job via other means. They may thus serve as a
search method of last resort on which jobseekers rely
after other methods failed (Loury, 2006). As unemploy-
ment duration increases, jobseekers gradually lose their
work-related ties. They thus depend more and more on
their family, friends, and acquaintances for information
on job openings and for someone willing to ‘put in a
good word for them’ with the employer. Accordingly,
individual characteristics that tend to reduce employ-
ability—such as low education or a subordinate class
position—may be associated with a more frequent use
of communal contacts.
Employability is also crucially affected by perform-
ance, motivation, and attitudes—factors that are diffi-
cult to observe for employers. They are therefore
sensitive to the information that a jobseeker was dis-
missed for non-economic reasons, interpreting it as a
negative signal of his or her ability—the so-called ‘lemon
effect’ of layoffs for a just cause (Gibbons and Katz,
1991). If communal ties primarily step in for jobseekers
with weaker employment prospects, jobseekers dis-
missed for non-economic reasons should be particularly
likely to find their job through a communal contact.
Likewise, a history of repeated—and recent—unemploy-
ment may signal lower work attachment. Moreover, it
may result in a weaker work-related social network and
thus increase the probability of having to rely on a com-
munal contact—simply for a lack of alternatives.
What are the consequences for job quality? If work-
related contacts convey more accurate information on
job requirements than do communal contacts or formal
recruitment channels, the resulting matches should take
less time, lead to higher productivity and better wages
(Marsden and Gorman, 2001: p. 469). Work-related
contacts should thus result in shorter unemployment
duration and higher wages than other job search
methods.
The empirical evidence is inconclusive. A European
panel study finds unemployment duration to be shorter
for jobs obtained through family and friends than
through formal channels (Bentolila, Michelacci and
Suarez, 2010). But while these jobs were found more
quickly, they were paid lower wages in some countries,
but not in others (Pellizzari, 2010). A cross-sectional
study based on the American Multi-City Study of Urban
Inequality finds that jobs obtained through an influen-
tial contact—people with the authority to hire—are
associated with higher wages (Kmec and Trimble, 2009:
p. 276). Bridges and Villemez (1986) differentiate be-
tween work-related and communal ties for a Chicago
sample of employed adults and find that work-related
contacts went along with a wage premium and commu-
nal contacts with a wage discount. Similarly, Green,
Tigges and Diaz (1999) report a negative relationship
between tie strength and earnings for Hispanics, with
stronger ties—which are often communal contacts—
being associated with lower income.
However, the three American studies are based on a
cross-sectional analysis of the wages currently earned by
employed workers. It is uncertain how these results
apply to starting wages of formerly unemployed job-
seekers. More crucially, without having information on
wages before taking on a given job, we do not know
whether the individuals using work-related contacts
(communal contacts) already had higher wages (lower
wages) to begin with. The same characteristics that af-
fect wages—class and education—may also affect the
probability of finding a job through a work-related or
communal contact. Accordingly, the analytical focus
should be on wage change rather than wage levels.
Indeed, when using longitudinal data for the United
States, Mouw (2003: p. 890) finds no difference in terms
of unemployment duration and wage change between
jobs found through personal contacts and jobs found
through another search method.
Hypotheses
Four hypotheses follow from our discussion. The first
hypothesis is based on the argument that informal con-
tacts allow workers with poor employability to substi-
tute family, friends, and acquaintances for a lack of
formal credentials.
Hypothesis 1: Low-educated jobseekers and the low-
skilled working class are more likely to find a job
through informal contacts than highly educated job-
seekers and the upper-middle class.
Our second hypothesis distinguishes between work-
related and communal ties and argues that work
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contacts are the channel through which the upper-
middle class finds a job, whereas communal contacts are
the method that the low-skilled working-class uses to
compensate for a lack of formal credentials.
Hypothesis 2: Low-educated jobseekers and the low-
skilled working class disproportionately find a job
through communal contacts, highly educated jobseekers
and the upper-middle class disproportionately through
work contacts.
Our third hypothesis expects different outcomes in
terms of wages. If work contacts provide exclusive infor-
mation on job openings and influence on employers,
they should lead to an increase in wages. In contrast, if
communal ties come into play once other search meth-
ods fail to provide a job, they should lead to a decrease
in wages with respect to work contacts and formal
methods.
Hypothesis 3: Finding a job through a work-related
contact is associated with a rise in wages, finding a job
through a communal contact with a fall in wages.
Our fourth hypothesis integrates time. We expect
that jobs found through communal ties are associated
with longer unemployment spells if family, friends, and
acquaintances step in once other search methods fail to
provide a job.
Hypothesis 4: As unemployment duration increases,
the likelihood of finding a job through a communal con-
tact—as compared to work-related contacts and formal
methods—increases.
Institutional Context, Data, and Measures
Institutional Context
Our analysis focuses on Switzerland. The Swiss labour
market shares many features with Austria and Germany,
notably a strong reliance on vocational education, an oc-
cupational labour market with a tight link between edu-
cation and employment, collective bargaining at the
industry level, and low levels of unemployment. The un-
employment rate fluctuated around 3 per cent at the
national level and 5 per cent in French-speaking
Switzerland in 2012 and 2013 when we collected our
data. While employment protection in Switzerland is
weak, unemployment insurance buffers the unemployed
comparatively well against income loss with a replace-
ment rate of 70–80 per cent during 12–24 months,
depending on age and prior contribution period.
Unemployed workers are strictly monitored, but benefit
from active labour market measures such as job search
counselling and training programmes.
Data
For our analysis, we collected our own data set based on
a large inflow sample of unemployed workers in
Switzerland. We surveyed all jobseekers who had newly
registered with the public employment services between
February and April 2012 in the canton of Vaud,
Switzerland’s largest French-speaking canton (popula-
tion of 767,000). This provided us with an inflow sam-
ple of 4,860 unemployed individuals, a 3-month entry
cohort. These jobseekers were surveyed for a second
time after they left the public employment services—dur-
ing an observation window of 17 months. The first sur-
vey, a paper-and-pencil questionnaire, was administered
during the compulsory information session organized by
the public employment service (response rate of 96 per
cent). The second survey was sent by e-mail and postal
mail to those jobseekers who had left the employment
service (and who had accepted that we merge their sur-
vey data with register data). Out of 2,793 jobseekers
who had exited unemployment, 1,448 individuals an-
swered this second questionnaire (response rate of 52
per cent).
For three quarters of our inflow sample, we were
allowed to match the survey data with data from the un-
employment register, providing us with information on
earlier unemployment spells, pre-unemployment wages,
and occupations. Among the 1,448 individuals who re-
sponded to both surveys, 1,213 individuals had found a
job and 235 individuals were in another situation (edu-
cation, family work, etc.). Note that attrition between
the two waves was not random. Migrants, men, individ-
uals with low education, and younger people were less
likely to answer to our second questionnaire—a result
well known from Switzerland’s largest longitudinal sur-
vey, the Swiss Household Panel (Lipps, 2007). Our ana-
lysis focuses on the group of successful jobseekers for
whom the two surveys and register data provide com-
plete information, leaving us with 1,194 observations.2
Measures
For our key variable, the channel through which a job
was found, we first distinguish jobs accessed through
formal search method (58 per cent of our sample) from
jobs found through an informal contact (42 per cent of
our sample). As formal search methods, we define jobs
found through job advertisements, information received
from public or private employment services, or direct
applications to employers. As informal contacts, we de-
fine jobs for which respondents received the first infor-
mation from a person who is part of their personal
network, thus excluding professional intermediaries.
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We further disaggregate informal contacts into
work-related contacts (17 per cent of our sample) and
communal contacts (25 per cent). Three types of inter-
mediaries are defined as work-related contacts: former
colleagues, peers from education who work in the same
sector, and other non-defined occupational acquaint-
ances. As communal contacts, we define family, friends,
neighbours, members of an association or club, and
other non-defined acquaintances. Respondents had to
choose among these personal intermediaries in the same
closed question—and therefore decided themselves
whether someone was first and foremost a work col-
league or a friend, an occupational acquaintance or a
neighbour.3
For the outcome of the job search, we measure
monthly wages before and after unemployment. This
gives us two time points and allows us to calculate the
within-person change in wages, thus reducing the influ-
ence of respondents’ time-constant unobserved charac-
teristics. We leave away earnings below 1,500 CHF (a
quarter of the national median wage), thereby excluding
marginal part-time jobs, apprenticeships, and intern-
ships. This leaves us with wage information for the pre-
and post-unemployment job for one-third of our sample
(N¼421). Unemployment duration is measured in
weeks and right-censored at 73.9 weeks (17 months).
Our key interest is on two independent variables:
education and class. We distinguish four educational
categories: (i) no more than lower secondary education;
(ii) vocational education at the upper secondary or lower
tertiary level (apprenticeships and advanced vocational
degrees); (iii) general education at the upper secondary
level (such as the baccalaureate); (iv) upper tertiary edu-
cation such as technical college or university degrees
(but excluding tertiary vocational degrees). For social
class, we use a simple version of the Erikson and
Goldthorpe (1992) schema and create four hierarchic-
ally ordered categories: (i) low-skilled working class
including machine operators and elementary occupa-
tions in production, sales, and services; (ii) skilled work-
ing class including craft workers, clerks, and skilled
sales and service workers; (iii) lower-middle class of as-
sociate managers, semi-professionals, and technicians;
(iv) upper-middle class of managers and professionals.4
In our sample of unemployed workers, it makes no
sense to distinguish an upper class from the upper-middle
class, as the upper class is rarely concerned by unemploy-
ment. Note, however, that unemployment is not a phe-
nomenon limited to an underclass. The upper-middle
class is broadly represented with 246 observations (20.4
per cent of our sample). Large upper-middle class occupa-
tions include, among many others, business professionals
(N¼31), architects and engineers (N¼ 25), computer
systems professionals (N¼23), and personnel and careers
professionals (N¼12). Accordingly, a quarter of success-
ful jobseekers earn post-unemployment wages that exceed
the national median wage.
Our models control for age, sex, and nationality, a
third of our sample being non-Swiss. In addition, we use
register data to identify whether a jobseeker has had a
prior unemployment spell between 2002 and 2012.
Moreover, we create two dummy variables for the rea-
son of unemployment: (i) dismissed for economic rea-
sons (25 per cent of our sample); (ii) dismissed for other,
non-economic reasons (23 per cent of our sample). The
first variable—economic reasons—is a proxy for reasons
that are largely beyond workers’ influence, whereas the
second variable—non-economic reasons—refers to rea-
sons which appear more closely linked to workers’ per-
formance. The other reasons of unemployment that we
do not further disaggregate include: never having
worked before, having been on a temporary contract,
having resigned from a job for various reasons, having
moved house.
Finally, we control for the search methods that job-
seekers had used at the very beginning of their un-
employment spell. Our first survey asked respondents as
to whether they had used a given search method over
the past week. We use this information to distinguish
five methods: (i) looking at, answering, or publishing
job offers in the newspaper; (ii) sending unsolicited ap-
plications or walking-in to workplaces; (iii) searching on
internet or uploading a CV on websites; (iv) enrolling in
a private job placement agency; (v) contacting family,
friends, colleagues, etc.
Descriptive Statistics
Table A1 shows the descriptive statistics of our variables
separately for workers in jobs found through formal
search methods, work-related contacts, and communal
contacts. The P-values tell us whether values differ be-
tween workers who found a job through a work-related
or communal contact. We find no gender difference, but
sizeable age effects. Young labour market entrants and
workers approaching the age of retirement are more
likely to find a job through communal contacts than
workers in their prime, between 25 and 54 years, who
are more prone to using work-related contacts. In terms
of nationality, Portuguese, Italian, and Spanish job-
seekers stand out as being particularly likely to find a
job through communal ties. In contrast, North
Europeans and North Americans (among whom many
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belong to Switzerland’s expat community) dispropor-
tionately obtain jobs through work-related contacts.
Class Differences in the Use of Informal
Contacts
Communal contacts are primarily used at the bottom of
the educational and class hierarchy, whereas work-
related contacts disproportionately serve the groups at
the top. We present the descriptive results for class and
education graphically by cross-tabulating, in Figure 1,
the hiring channel with four educational levels and four
social classes. 35 per cent of low-educated jobseekers
and 32 per cent of the low-skilled working class received
the first information on their current job from commu-
nal ties—family, friends, or acquaintances—compared
with only 17 per cent of university-educated jobseekers
and 15 per cent of jobseekers in the upper-middle class.
In contrast, 23 per cent of university-trained workers
returned to employment thanks to a work contact, com-
pared to only 14 per cent among those with compulsory
education. Note that individuals in higher educational
and class settings also rely more often on formal search
methods: 64 per cent of the upper-middle class found a
job through a formal method as compared to 52 per
cent among the low-skilled working class.
Jobseekers who had experienced previous spells of
unemployment and who were dismissed for non-
economic reasons disproportionately used a communal
tie to return to a job. This finding is consistent with the
argument that communal ties primarily serve jobseekers
with poorer employability. As for the search channels
used in the first weeks of unemployment, there are no
differences for the use of newspapers, unsolicited
applications, and internet. However, a disproportionate
share of individuals who would find later on a job
through a formal search method or a work contact had
enrolled themselves in a private job placement agency,
and respondents finding a job through a work contact
were particularly likely to have talked about their job
search with their personal network (see Table A1).
We estimate multinomial logistic regressions with
the hiring channel as the dependent variable, distin-
guishing between jobseekers who found their job
through (i) formal means, (ii) work contacts, or (iii)
communal contacts. While a first model only includes
socio-demographic controls, education, and class, a se-
cond model adds a dummy for previous unemployment,
the reasons for unemployment, and the search channels
used in the first month of unemployment. Table 1 pre-
sents results expressed as marginal effects.
Low-educated respondents are much more likely to
find a job through a communal contact than the other
educational groups—differences ranging between 7 and
12 percentage points. In contrast, having obtained a vo-
cational degree strongly increases the likelihood of find-
ing a job through a formal search method. The close
link between Switzerland’s vocational education and the
labour market reduces the importance of personal con-
tacts for vocationally trained workers. However, once
we control for socio-demographic attributes and social
class, educational groups no longer vary in their use of
work-related contacts. Contrary to our hypothesis, more
highly educated groups are not more likely to rely on
work-related contacts than low-educated jobseekers.
In terms of class, we observe that members of the
upper-middle class disproportionately find a job through
formal search methods and are less likely to rely on
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Figure 1. The source of the first information through which the unemployed found a new job—by education (left) and class (right)
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Table 1. Multinomial logistic regression for the probability of finding a job through a formal search method, a work con-
tact, or a communal contact—average marginal effects (SE in parentheses)
M1 M2
Formal
method
Work
contact
Communal
contact
Formal
method
Work
contact
Communal
contact
Education (ref: less than upper secondary)
Vocational upper secondary/tertiary 0.09** 0.02 0.07** 0.09** 0.02 0.07**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
General upper secondary 0.08 0.04 0.12** 0.08 0.04 0.12**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
(Applied) university 0.07 0.03 0.10** 0.07 0.03 0.10**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Social class (low-skilled working class)
Skilled working class 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Lower-middle class 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Upper-middle class 0.10* 0.01 0.12** 0.10* 0.02 0.12**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
Male 0.04 0.04* 0.00 0.04 0.04* 0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Age (ref: 15–24)
25–29 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.00
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
30–39 0.06 0.09** 0.03 0.07 0.10** 0.03
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
40–49 0.03 0.09** 0.06 0.03 0.09** 0.06
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
50–54 0.05 0.11** 0.06 0.05 0.11** 0.07
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
55–64 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.06
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Nationality (ref: Swiss)
Portugal 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.05
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
France 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.05
(0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
Italy, Spain 0.03 0.07 0.10* 0.04 0.06 0.10*
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
NW Europe, North America 0.20* 0.12** 0.08 0.21* 0.12** 0.09
(0.11) (0.06) (0.10) (0.11) (0.06) (0.10)
Ex-Yugoslavia, Albania 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.04
(0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09)
Other countries 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.07
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
Previous unemployment 0.02 0.03 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Reason for unemployment: dismissed
for economic reasons
0.03 0.01 0.02
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Reason for unemployment: dismissed
for other reasons
0.05 0.03 0.08**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Job search method used
Newspapers: yes 0.02 0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
(continued)
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communal contacts. Compared to the low-skilled work-
ing class, the proportion of the upper-middle class who
find a job through a communal contact is 12 percentage
points lower.
Adding controls for previous unemployment, the rea-
son of dismissal and the different search methods used
in the first weeks of unemployment do not change these
results. However, these controls lead to findings that are
interesting in their own right. Being dismissed for non-
economic reasons increases the probability of using a
communal tie by 8 percentage points, whereas talking to
one’s network about job-seeking at the beginning of un-
employment increases the likelihood to obtain a job
through a work-related contact by 7 percentage points.
Moreover, we find that men are somewhat more
likely than women, and middle-aged jobseekers some-
what more likely than young labour market entrants to
obtain a job via a work-related tie. Likewise, the North
European/American expat group disproportionately
finds a job through work ties, whereas Italians and
Spaniards are particularly prone to relying on communal
ties. In general, all immigrant groups tend to be some-
what less likely to find a job through a formal search
method than the largest group of Swiss jobseekers. As in
other countries, migrants in Switzerland thus also de-
pend more on personal contacts than do national
citizens.
Socio-demographic characteristics come in bundles:
a university education typically goes along with an
upper-middle class status. Accordingly, we combine
class and education by attributing to each social class its
most frequent education: (i) no post-mandatory educa-
tion to the low-skilled working class, (ii) vocational
education to the skilled working, (iii) vocational educa-
tion to the lower-middle class, (iv) (applied) university
education to the upper-middle class. We then calculate
how the predicted probabilities for finding a job through
a hiring channel varies for a Swiss man aged 30–39 de-
pending on the class-education group and the reason of
dismissal (economic/non-economic).
Figure 2 shows the predicted probabilities for work-
related and communal ties. Together with the jobs found
through formal means (the residual category, not
shown), these percentages add up to 100 per cent.
Work-related ties are of greater importance at the top
than the bottom of the class-education hierarchy.
Among members of the upper-middle class dismissed for
economic reasons, 25 per cent found a job through a
work tie, compared to only 16 per cent within the skilled
working class dismissed for the same reasons. Being dis-
missed for non-economic reasons decreases the likeli-
hood of finding a job through a work contact for all
classes.
The opposite situation applies to communal contacts.
Among the jobseekers of the low-skilled working class
who were dismissed for non-economic reasons, 38 per
cent relied on a communal tie, compared to only 16 per
cent among those members of the upper-middle class
having lost their job for the same reasons. The more fa-
vourable a jobseeker’s class and education, the less likely
he or she is to rely on family, friends, or acquaintances.
On the contrary, being dismissed for non-economic rea-
sons—and hence possibly a reason linked to one’s per-
formance—strongly increases the likelihood of finding a
job through a communal contact: by 9 and 8 percentage
points for the low-skilled and skilled working class, by 6
Table 1. (Continued)
M1 M2
Formal
method
Work
contact
Communal
contact
Formal
method
Work
contact
Communal
contact
Unsolicited applications: yes 0.03 0.03 0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Internet: yes 0.05 0.05* 0.00
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Private job placement: yes 0.06* 0.00 0.06**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Social network: yes 0.11*** 0.07 0.04
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Pseudo R 0.033 0.049
N 1,194 1,194
***P<0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.10.
The values in bold are statistically significant at P < 0.10.
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and 5 points for the lower-middle and upper-middle
class.
Differences by the Hiring Channel in Wages
and Unemployment Duration
How do wages vary depending on the hiring channel?
When looking at the monthly post-unemployment wage,
we find that jobseekers who secured employment
through a work-related contact earn a wage that is 14
per cent higher than jobs accessed through formal meth-
ods and 34 per cent higher than jobs found through
communal ties (see Table 2). However, this wage gap
should not be interpreted as being caused by the hiring
channel: if more highly educated workers disproportion-
ately learn about their jobs from work contacts, it is
their skill profile—and not the hiring channel—which
explains their higher wages.
Once we introduce controls such as sex, age, nation-
ality, education, class, previous unemployment, reason
of dismissal, and job search methods used, the difference
in post-unemployment wages decreases from 34 to 13
per cent (see Table A2 for the coefficients of control
variables). This tells us that primarily low-paid jobs are
filled through word-of-mouth from family, friends, and
acquaintances, whereas high-paid jobs are more often
found thanks to work-related contacts.
If we further interact the hiring channel with social
class, we observe that having found a job through either
formal methods or work ties is associated with a sub-
stantially higher post-unemployment wage for the
skilled working class and the lower-middle class, but not
for the low-skilled working class. For these later job-
seekers, jobs found through communal contacts are
associated with somewhat higher earnings than jobs
found through formal methods or work contacts. It is
thus not the preferred hiring channel of the low-skilled
working class—communal ties—that causes their wages
to be lower.
However, it is more interesting to look at a within-
person measure, namely, how an individual’s post-
unemployment wage differs relative to his or her pre-
unemployment wage. This measure suggests that finding
a job through work contacts as compared to finding a
N = 1194
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
Low-skilled working
class
Skilled working class Lower-middle class Upper-middle class
Communal contact, dismissed for other reasons
Communal contact, dismissed for economic reasons
Work contact, dismissed for economic reasons
Work contact, dismissed for other reasons
Figure 2. Predicted probability for a Swiss man aged 30–39 to have found a job through a work contact or communal contact,
depending on reason for unemployment. N ¼ 1,194. Note: Predicted probabilities are based on a multinomial regression with the
dependent variable ‘mean through which the unemployed have found a job’ (1 ¼ formal mean, 2 ¼ work contact, 3 ¼ communal
contact). These analyses only include those individuals who found a job. The results of finding a job through a formal mean are not
shown, but note that the probability of finding a job through a (1) formal mean, (2) work contact, and (3) communal contact add up
to 1 (100 per cent).
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job through a communal tie (or a formal search method)
does not make any difference whatsoever. The coeffi-
cients for the job search channel are small and the stand-
ard errors large. If we introduce an interaction term
between the hiring channel and social classes, we do not
find any systematic differences in how the hiring channel
affects the change in wages for different classes. For all
these models, the adjusted R2 statistics suggest that the
hiring channel explains literally no variance in wage
differences.
The unemployed who found a job via communal ties
were earning less than those using a work tie or a formal
method to begin with—that is, prior to their unemploy-
ment spell (see Table 1 above). However, they did not
lose out from relying on a communal contact. Thanks to
information on two distinct time points, our analysis
shows that we should not interpret causally the cross-
sectional correlation between hiring channel and post-
hiring earnings.
This result is corroborated by an analysis on the
question of subjective wage evolution, where jobseekers
were asked to compare their post-unemployment wage
to their pre-unemployment wage and to state, on a 5-
point ordinal scale, whether it was much higher, slightly
higher, equal, slightly lower, or much lower. This ques-
tion was answered by two-thirds of our sample
(N¼870) and shows no differences in wage change be-
tween the hiring channels. Coefficients are small, stand-
ard errors large, and the R2 close to zero (result
available from the authors).
In a last analysis, we compare the duration of un-
employment between jobseekers who found employ-
ment through different channels. On average,
unemployment duration is longest for jobseekers having
found a job through communal ties (28.9 weeks) and
shortest for those having relied on work-related ties
(25.4 weeks), formal search methods being associated
with intermediary unemployment duration of 26.1
weeks (see Table A1).
It is common in economics to introduce the job hir-
ing channel into a regression on unemployment duration
to estimate its effect on the length of unemployment
(Bentolila, Michelacci and Suarez, 2010: p. 33). If we
follow this procedure and analyse the differences in un-
employment duration in a multivariate model with a
large set of controls, we still find communal contacts to
be associated with 3.2 weeks longer unemployment
spells than jobs found through work contacts (see Table
2). However, this result does not imply that communal
ties cause longer unemployment spells. Rather, this find-
ing is consistent with the idea that jobseekers with
gloomier employment prospects disproportionately rely
on family, friends, and acquaintances to get a job.
This argument is further substantiated if we intro-
duce an interaction term between the hiring channel and
social class. We find that work contacts are associated
with substantially shorter unemployment for the skilled
working class and the lower-middle class—two classes
where vocational degrees dominate—but not for the
low-skilled working class. For this later class, using
communal ties does not go along with prolonged un-
employment. If anything, unemployment is shorter for
those jobseekers of the low-skilled working class who
relied on communal ties rather than on work contacts
(note, however, that standard errors are large and coeffi-
cients estimated with little precision). For the whole
Table 2. Linear coefficients for the effect of how a job was found on unemployment duration and wages
Controls included Log of post-unemployment
wage (OLS coefficients)
Difference between post-
and pre-unemployment wage in
CHF (OLS coefficients)
Unemployment duration
in weeks
(Tobit coefficients)
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Communal contacts (ref.)
Work contacts 0.34*** 0.13* 33 19 3.55* 3.17*
(0.08) (0.07) (239) (241) (1.92) (1.89)
Formal method 0.14** 0.03 59 10 2.61* 2.00
(0.07) (0.06) (239) (288) (1.45) (1.42)
Adjusted R2 0.0192 0.3063 0.005 0.0549 0.0004 0.0099
N 718 718 416 416 1,194 1,194
***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.10.
For the full model with controls, see Table A2.
R2 refers to pseudo R for Tobit regression and adjusted R2 for OLS regression.
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sample, communal ties are thus associated with longer
unemployment spells because they are disproportion-
ately used by jobseekers whose employment prospects
are precarious and who therefore face longer unemploy-
ment spells—and not because using communal ties per
se prolongs unemployment duration.
Conclusion
What do these findings imply for our hypotheses? The
upper-middle class is less likely to find a job through a
personal contact than the working class. Despite lower
amounts of social capital, disadvantaged groups of job-
seekers tend to rely to a greater extent on their social
network than more privileged social categories. It is not
the amount of social capital that determines whether a
jobseeker uses his or her social network to secure em-
ployment. Rather, social capital and informal con-
tacts—notably family, friends, and acquaintances—are
used by those jobseekers who have less to offer in terms
of formal credentials (Chua, 2011).
However, the sole distinction between formal and in-
formal contacts hides large variance among informal
contacts, between work-related and communal ties.
Communal ties primarily help jobseekers with weaker
employability to find a job: individuals without upper-
secondary education, the low-skilled working class and
jobseekers dismissed for non-economic reasons. For
these groups, family, friends, and acquaintances step in
and compensate for the difficulty of finding a job
through other channels. Consequently, communal con-
tacts are associated with lower wages and longer un-
employment duration than work-related contacts.
In contrast, our results give only lukewarm support
to the hypothesis that highly educated jobseekers and
the upper-middle class disproportionately find their jobs
through work-related contacts. Evidence is stronger
with respect to income groups: jobseekers with higher
pre-unemployment wages are more likely to find a job
through a work tie than through either formal means or
communal contacts.
An influential argument in economic sociology ex-
pects personal contacts—and notably work-related con-
tacts—to convey privileged information on job
requirements and to lead to better job matches than for-
mal recruitment channels (Granovetter, 1974, Marsden
and Gorman, 2001: p. 469). Better job matches imply
higher productivity and should go along with a wage
premium as compared to jobs found through other
channels. However, our data show no such wage pre-
mium for finding a job through work ties.
In the social network literature, nearly as many stud-
ies find a negative or a null relationship as a positive ef-
fect of personal contacts on earnings (Kmec and
Trimble, 2009: p. 266). We argued above that this rela-
tionship should be analysed with a double focus on ac-
tive jobseekers and on change in earnings between the
pre- and post-unemployment job. When doing so, we
find that work-related ties are disproportionately used
by formerly well-paid jobseekers, but do not lead to
higher wages. Likewise, jobs for low-paid workers are
often passed on through communal contacts, but the
same jobseekers would not have secured higher wages if
they had found a job through a work contact or a formal
search method. We thus observe the null relationship be-
tween hiring channel and earnings for Switzerland that
Mouw (2003) found in his longitudinal analysis for the
United States.
However, our results for unemployed jobseekers may
well be due to the specific institutional and historical
context that prevailed in Switzerland in the period under
study. Like Austria and Germany, Switzerland is also a
prime example of an occupational labour market where
educational tracks are closely linked to specific occupa-
tions. In this context, educational credentials—notably
vocational degrees—and work experience in a given oc-
cupation send clear signals to employers about the skills
a jobseeker has or does not have. This may reduce the
benefits brought by personal contacts for job allocation
to a greater extent than in internal labour markets such
as the United States.
In addition, our sample of unemployed individuals
looked for a job in a labour market with only 5 per cent
of unemployment. Personal contacts may well become
more instrumental when unemployment rates are higher
and the competition for rare job vacancies fiercer. In a
slack labour market, work experience and educational
degrees may no longer suffice to obtain a good job.
Jobseekers may additionally depend on their former col-
leagues and friends to ‘put in a good word for them’
with employers. As longitudinal studies become avail-
able for a growing number of countries, future research
may provide us with an answer to this question.
Notes
1 Nearly 30 per cent of Granovetter’s (1974) ori-
ginal sample, all of whom had recently changed
jobs, denied having actively searched.
2 The entire data set has been documented in
English and is available free-of-charge from the
Swiss data archive FORS, see https://forsbase.unil.
ch/ or directly contact the authors.
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3 Three questions were crucial to distinguish the
three search methods: (i) formal search, (ii)
work-related contact, (iii) communal ties.
Question 1: Through which means did you get
the very first information that your new em-
ployer wanted to hire somebody? Answers from:
newspaper, internet, unsolicited application, public
employment service, private placement agency, a
person. If the first information was obtained
from a person, then the second question was:
Did you know this person before he or she gave
you the information on the new job? Answers
from: (1) Yes, he or she was part of my social
network. (2) Yes, but he or she was not part of
my social network (p. ex. counsellor working in
the public or private placement agency). (3) No,
I did not know him or her before. If the first in-
formation was obtained from a person that was
part of jobseekers’ network, then the third ques-
tion was: Who was the person who gave you the
first information on your new job or your new
employer? The following 10 answers were pro-
vided: (1) colleague; (2) colleague from school or
studies; (3) member of an association; (4) another
acquaintance from work; (5) another unemployed
person I got to know while unemployed; (6)
close friend; (7) neighbour; (8) a member of my
closer family (parents, brothers and sisters, chil-
dren, spouses); (9) a member of my wider family
(cousins, uncles or aunts, step-family, in-laws);
(10) other acquaintance.
4 We coded occupations based on the Swiss
Standard Classification of Occupations 2000 at
the five-digit levels. The Stata codes are available
from the authors.
Acknowledgements
This article is based on research carried out jointly with
Giuliano Bonoli, Rafael Lalive, and Nicolas Turtschi. The au-
thors are grateful for their help and advice. Likewise, they are
thankful for the comments made by Patrick McDonald, Emily
Murphy, Michele Pellizzari, and the four anonymous reviewers.
Funding
This work was supported by the Swiss National Centre of
Competence in Research ‘LIVESOvercoming vulnerability: life
course perspectives’, which is financed by the Swiss National
Science Foundation [grant number 51NF40-160590].
Additional funding by Switzerland’s State Secretariat for
Economic Affairs is gratefully acknowledged.
References
Bentolila, S., Michelacci, C. and Suarez, J. (2010). Social con-
tacts and occupational choice. Economica, 77, 20–45.
Bessy, C. and Marchal, E. (2009). Le roˆle des re´seaux et du mar-
che´ dans les recrutements. Enque^te aupre`s des entreprises.
Revue Franc¸aise de Socio- Economie, 3, 121–146.
Bonoli, G. and Hinrichs, K. (2012). Statistical discrimination
and employers’ recruitment practices for low-skilled workers.
European Societies, 14, 338–361.
Bonoli, G. and Turtschi, N. (2015). Inequality in social capital and la-
bour market re-entry among unemployed people in Switzerland.
Research in Social Stratification and Mobility, 42, 97–95.
Bourdieu, P. (1979). La distinction. Critique sociale du juge-
ment. Paris: Editions de Minuit.
Boxman, E., De Graaf, P. and Flap, H. (1991). The impact of so-
cial and human capital on the income attainment of Dutch
managers. Social Networks, 13, 51–73.
Bridges, W. P. and Villemez, W. J. (1986). Informal hiring and
income in the labour market. American Sociological Review,
51, 574–582.
Chua, V. (2011). Social networks and labour market outcomes
in a meritocracy. Social Networks, 33, 1–11.
Corcoran, M., Datcher, L. and Duncan, G. J. (1980). Most
workers find jobs through word of mouth. Monthly Labour
Review, 103, 33–35.
Erikson, R. and Goldthorpe, J. (1992). The Constant Flux.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Forse´, M. (2001). Roˆle spe´cifique et croissance du capital social.
Revue de l’OFCE, 76, 189–216.
Gibbons, R. and Katz, L. (1991). Layoffs and lemons. Journal of
Labor Economics, 9, 351–380.
Granovetter, M. S. (1974). Getting a Job. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Green, G. P., Tigges, L. M. and Diaz, D. (1999). Racial and
ethnic differences in job-search strategies in Atlanta,
Boston, and Los Angeles. Social Science Quarterly, 80,
263–278.
Harsløf, I. (2006). The impact of welfare and labour market in-
stitutions on informal recruitment in European Youth Labour
Markets. European Societies, 8, 555–576.
Kmec, J. A. and Trimble, L. B. (2009). Does it pay to have a net-
work contact? Social network ties, workplace racial context,
and pay outcomes. Social Science Research, 38, 266–278.
Lipps, O. (2007). Attrition in the Swiss Household Panel.
Methoden – Daten – Analysen, 1, 45–68.
Loury, L. D. (2006). Some contacts are more equal than others:
informal networks, job tenure, and wages. Journal of Labour
Economics, 24, 299–318.
Marsden, P. V. and Gorman, E. H. (2001). Social networks, job
changes, and recruitment. In Berg, I. and Kalleberg, A. (Eds.),
Sourcebook of Labour Markets: Evolving Structures and Processes.
New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, pp. 467–502.
European Sociological Review, 2017, Vol. 00, No. 0 13
McDonald, S. and Elder, G. H. (2006). When does social capital
matter? Non-searching for jobs across the life course. Social
Forces, 8585, 521–549.
McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L. and Cook, J. M. (2001). Birds
of a feather: homophily in social networks. Annual Review of
Sociology, 27, 415–444.
Mouw, T. (2003). Social capital and finding a job: do contacts
matter? American Sociological Review, 68, 868–898.
Pellizzari, M. (2010). Do friends and relatives really help in get-
ting a good job? Industrial and Labour Relations Review, 63,
494–510.
Pichler, F. and Wallace, C. (2009). Social capital and social class
in Europe: the role of social networks in social stratification.
European Sociological Review, 25, 319–332.
Smith, S. S. (2000). Mobilizing social resources: race, ethnic,
and gender differences in social capital and persisting wage
inequalities. Sociological Quarterly, 41, 509–537.
Daniel Oesch is Professor of Sociology at the University
of Lausanne. His research interests comprise social
stratification, unemployment and the labour market. He
is the author of Redrawing the Class Map (Palgrave
2006) and Occupational Change in Europe(Oxford
University Press 2013).
Anna von Ow earned her PhD at the University of
Lausanne in 2016 for a study on social networks and the
labour market. She works for the Swiss Intercantonal
Conference of Public Education and evaluates education
programmes.
14 European Sociological Review, 2017, Vol. 00, No. 0
Appendix
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of key variables—unemployed individuals who found a job
Proportion
(or mean)
of sample
Job through
formal
method
Job through
work
contact
Job through
communal
contact
p-value of contrast
communal versus
work contact
Education
Less than upper secondary 0.268 0.232 0.232 0.373 0.001
Vocational upper secondary / tertiary 0.375 0.397 0.297 0.373 0.085
General upper secondary 0.112 0.117 0.131 0.088 0.124
(Applied) university 0.245 0.254 0.338 0.167 0.000
Social class
Low-skilled working class 0.188 0.170 0.182 0.235 0.153
Skilled working class 0.415 0.413 0.328 0.477 0.001
Lower-middle class 0.192 0.194 0.222 0.170 0.144
Upper-middle class 0.204 0.223 0.268 0.118 0.000
Male 0.472 0.454 0.533 0.471 0.182
Age
15–24 0.149 0.160 0.085 0.166 0.009
25–29 0.174 0.171 0.175 0.179 0.905
30–39 0.310 0.302 0.355 0.300 0.192
40–49 0.223 0.229 0.245 0.195 0.184
50–54 0.077 0.076 0.095 0.065 0.217
55–64 0.067 0.061 0.045 0.094 0.039
Nationality
Swiss 0.625 0.661 0.607 0.550 0.208
Portugal 0.108 0.096 0.089 0.147 0.057
France 0.077 0.073 0.095 0.075 0.433
Italy, Spain 0.057 0.052 0.040 0.078 0.081
NW Europe, North America 0.022 0.015 0.050 0.016 0.029
Ex-Yugoslavia, Albania 0.021 0.020 0.015 0.26 0.399
Other countries 0.091 0.082 0.105 0.107 0.914
Previous unemployment 0.397 0.400 0.353 0.428 0.090
Reason of dismissal: economic
reasons
0.251 0.262 0.259 0.221 0.335
Reason of dismissal: other
non-economic reasons
0.225 0.206 0.194 0.290 0.015
Job search method used
Newspapers 0.596 0.608 0.557 0.593 0.428
Unsolicited applications 0.548 0.534 0.567 0.570 0.949
Internet 0.774 0.793 0.756 0.739 0.671
Private job placement 0.308 0.325 0.328 0.254 0.070
Social network 0.458 0.425 0.572 0.459 0.012
Duration of unemployment (in weeks) 26.7 26.1 25.4 28.9 0.077
Pre-unemployment wage (in CHF) N ¼ 748 5,140 5,115 5,845 4,721 0.000
Post-unemployment wage (in CHF) N ¼ 697 5,440 5,250 6,250 5,143 0.000
Wage difference (in CHF)a N ¼ 416 56 61.6 72.4 26.9 0.816
aWage differences are within-person differences for those individuals who found a job, had a job paying more than 1,500 CHF before and after being unemployed,
and disclosed information on both wages.
N observations: 1,194 (for wages, see annotations).
Bold: t-test indicates a difference in means for work-related and communal contacts that are significant at P<0.10.
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Table A2. Linear regression coefficients for the effect of how a job was found on wages and unemployment duration (full
models)
M1 M2 M3
Log of post-unemployment
wage (OLS)
Difference between
post- and pre-unemployment
wage in CHF (OLS)
Unemployment
duration in
weeks (Tobit)
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Way job was found (ref: communal contact)
Work contact 0.13* (0.07) 19 (242) 3.17* (1.89)
Formal method 0.03 (0.06) 10 (288) 2.00 (1.42)
Male 0.09* (0.05) 366* (196) 1.47 (1.20)
Age 0.08*** (0.02) 89 (72) 1.17*** (0.40)
Age squared 0.00*** (0.00) 0.9 (0.9) 0.01* (0.01)
Education (ref: less than upper secondary)
Vocational upper secondary / tertiary 0.16** (0.07) 320 (299) 1.82 (1.69)
General upper secondary 0.15 (0.09) 488 (366) 0.33 (2.22)
(Applied) university 0.34*** (0.08) 130 (346) 2.49 (2.06)
Social class (low-skilled working class)
Skilled working class 0.19** (0.08) 162 (312) 3.26* (1.74)
Lower-middle class 0.15 (0.09) 100 (364) 4.78** (2.09)
Upper-middle class 0.20** (0.09) 306 (378) 3.26 (2.20)
Nationality (ref: Swiss)
Portugal 0.28*** (0.09) 442 (376) 0.72 (2.14)
France 0.01 (0.09) 158 (352) 1.81 (2.28)
Italy, Spain 0.13 (0.11) 1057** (442) 0.69 (2.61)
NW Europe, North America 0.14 (0.16) 1176* (645) 3.45 (4.22)
Ex-Yugoslavia, Albania 0.05 (0.25) 267 (1133) 11.31*** (4.26)
Other countries 0.04 (0.10) 30 (384) 2.20 (2.27)
Previous unemployment spell 0.16*** (0.05) 56 (194) 3.97*** (1.22)
Reason for unemployment: dismissed for
economic reasons
0.09 (0.06) 220 (230) 0.09 (1.44)
Reason for unemployment: dismissed for
other reasons
0.11* (0.06) 207 (241) 3.78** (1.46)
Job search method used
Newspapers: yes 0.03 (0.05) 224 (212) 1.31 (1.30)
Unsolicited applications: yes 0.10* (0.05) 227 (195) 0.85 (1.22)
Internet: yes 0.31*** (0.07) 859*** (281) 0.77 (1.65)
Private job placement: yes 0.08 (0.05) 152 (203) 3.14** (1.31)
Social network: yes 0.08 (0.05) 41 (204) 0.20 (1.24)
Working hours 0.03 (0.00)
Constant 5.12 (0.34) 2256 1352 2.37 (7.38)
Adjusted R2 0.3063 0.0549 0.0099
N 718 416 1,194
***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.10.
R2 refers to pseudo R for Tobit regression and adjusted R2 for OLS regression.
16 European Sociological Review, 2017, Vol. 00, No. 0
Table A3. Linear regression coefficients for the effect of how a job was found on wages and unemployment duration (full
models)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(log) post-unemployment
wage level
Wage change
in CHF
Unemployment
weeks
W/o
interaction
With
interaction
W/o
interaction
With
interaction
W/o
interaction
With
interaction
Way job was found (ref: communal contact)
Work contacts 0.13* 0.22 10 124 3.17* 4.91
(0.07) (0.19) (288) (842) (1.89) (4.16)
Formal methods 0.03 0.23 19 60 2.00 1.36
(0.06) (0.15) (242) (601) (1.42) (3.04)
Social class (low-skilled working class)
Skilled working class 0.20** 0.05 162 504 3.26* 0.29
(0.08) (0.14) (312) (570) (1.75) (3.01)
Lower-middle class 0.15 0.15 100 732 4.78** 1.68
(0.09) (0.16) (364) (674) (2.09) (3.80)
Upper-middle class 0.20** 0.01 306 103 3.26 5.47
(0.09) (0.20) (378) (800) (2.20) (4.32)
Interactions class  way found (ref: communal
contact  low-skilled working)
Work contact  skilled working class 0.41* 210 12.89**
(0.23) (953) (5.16)
Work contact  lower-middle class 0.53** 1,580 10.39*
(0.25) (1,027) (5.88)
Work contact  upper-middle class 0.22 166 3.46
(0.26) (1,080) (6.05)
Formal method  skilled working class 0.32* 545 1.69
(0.17) (688) (3.69)
Formal method  lower-middle class 0.35* 20 2.22
(0.14) (793) (4.49)
Formal method  upper-middle class 0.16 478 3.87
(0.22) (876) (4.86)
Adjusted R2 0.3063 0.3072 0.0549 0.0716 0.0099 0.0107
Observations 718 718 416 416 1,194 1,194
***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.10.
Controls introduced for sex, age, age squared, nationality, education, reason of dismissal, job search method used at the beginning of unemployment spell.
R2 refers to pseudo R for Tobit regression and adjusted R2 for OLS regression.
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